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Genocide in China: Uighur Re-education Camps and
International Response
By: Julia Stern 1

Uighurs in the autonomous region of Xinjiang, China, have
long faced discrimination at the hands of the Chinese Communist
Party (“CCP”). 2 At the time of this writing, over the past five
years, the oppression of Uighurs and other Muslim minorities has
escalated to crimes against humanity and genocide. 3 Despite
ongoing international pressure and sanctions to end these human
rights violations, the situation in Xinjiang continues to worsen,
evidenced by new information leaked or reported by former
detainees. 4 China has also begun exerting its international power to
pressure foreign countries to report Uighurs and has warned other
countries against attending the United Nations Human Rights
Council side panel on Uighur rights. 5 To date, the Chinese
government has concealed the exact number of Uighurs detained in
Xinjiang “re-education” camps and their treatment within these
camps. 6
Associate Member, (2020-2021), Immigration and& Human Rights Law
Review, University of Cincinnati.
2
U.S. House, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and
Oversight, The Uighurs: A History of Persecution (H.R. 111-28, 2009).
3
Canadian Parliament, Statement by the Subcommittee on International Human
Rights Concerning the human rights situation of Uyghurs and other Turkic
Muslims in Xinjiang, China (Oct. 21, 2020),
https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-2/SDIR/newsrelease/10903199.
4
Eli Meixler, 'I Begged Them to Kill Me.' Uighur Woman Tells Congress of
Torture in Chinese Internment Camps, (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://time.com/5467628/china-uighur-congress-torture/.
5
Agence France-Presse, UN diplomats and activists describe Chinese pressure
and ‘threats’ over Uygur event at UN rights council, (Apr. 2, 2019),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3004214/un-diplomatsand-activists-describe-chinese-pressure-and.
6
Wen Lii, Taiwan Voices Support for Uyghurs in China The human rights crisis
in Xinjiang foreshadows Taiwan’s future under PRC control, and the island
knows it. (May 2, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/taiwan-voicessupport-for-uyghurs-in-china/.
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This article will outline the historical relationship between the
CCP and Uighur Muslims. As well as analyze the relationship
between the CCP and international community to ascertain
whether the CCP is committing genocide and, if genocide is
occurring, how the international community can respond.
I.

BACKGROUND

To understand the legal and political situation surrounding
the Uighur “re-education camps,” it is critical to first understand
the history between Uighurs and the current Chinese Communist
Party (“CCP”). The Uighurs (also spelled Uyghur or Uygur) are a
Turkic-speaking, Muslim minority group located in the
Autonomous Region of Xinjiang, China. 7 Xinjiang is culturally,
linguistically, and historically part of a Turkic civilization distinct
from the civilization that developed in China. 8
The colonization of Xinjiang occurred following a fifteenyear revolt by Turkic Muslims against Han Chinese occupiers. 9
Colonizing Xinjiang allowed for the alleviation of population
pressures and brought new economic opportunities to mainland
China. 10 Once settled in the region, China created policies of both
assimilation and destruction (of historical beliefs, practices,
language, etc.). 11 Historically, China has participated in
assimilation tactics that strengthen nationalism. One of China’s
assimilation tactics occurred during and after the Cultural
Revolution, when China forbade ethnic minorities from using their

Congressional Research Service, Uyghurs in China, (Jan. 4, 2021).
Eric Hyer, China’s Policy towards Uighur Nationalism, 26 No. 1,80, Journal
of Muslim Minority Affairs, (2006).
9
Felix K. Chang, China's Central Asian Power and Problems (1997).
10
Id.
11
Ethnic Relations in Contemporary China, Pol. and Soc., 85-108 (Vol. 25,
2006).
7
8
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native languages and suppressed traditional customs and
practices. 12
Xinjiang is known as an internal colony. 13 All non-Han
groups of people were placed in an ethnopolitical category known
as “minority nationalities” or shaoshu minzu. 14,15 This grouping
makes it appear as if the conquered country has always been a part
of China and “erases the difference between those who built their
own states or empires in the past, which could easily fulfill the
criteria for being recognized as independent states with their own
seat in the United Nations.” 16 The concept that people in these
colonized regions have an ancient history of being “Chinese
people” is utilized to claim unity within the country and justify
nationalist “re-education” and internment of Uighurs. 17
It is important to note that western concepts of nationality
and minority oppression do not necessarily apply to Chinese
society. China has a complex composition of Chinese minority
groups and a fusion of people creating a difference in the
understanding of nationality and legal equality. 18 Uighurs have

Michael Dillon, Religious Minorities and China, Minority Rights Group
International (2001).
13
Barry Sautman, Is Xinjiang an Internal Colony?, Jstor, 239-271 (Vol. 2, No.
2, 2000).
14
Jin Binggao, When Does The Word 'Minority Nationality' [Shaoshu Minzu]
[First] Appear in Our Country? (1987).
15
Han dynasty, Briticana (last visited Fed. 6, 2021) the Han dynasty establish
what was considered Chinese culture. “Han” became the Chinese word denoting
someone who is ethnically Chinese. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Handynasty
16
Id. at 524.
17
James Leibold, Despite China’s denials, its treatment of the Uyghurs should
be called what it is: cultural genocide, The Conversation (July 24, 2019),
https://theconversation.com/despite-chinas-denials-its-treatment-of-the-uyghursshould-be-called-what-it-is-cultural-genocide-120654.
18
Rong Ma, Ethnic Relations in Contemporary China: Cultural Tradition and
Ethnic Policies since 1949, 25:1 Policy and Society 85 (2006).
12
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never fully assimilated into Chinese culture in the same way that
many other minority nationalities in China have. 19
According to the Council on Foreign Relations Report, the
religious activities of Uighur Muslims are tightly controlled by
government authorities, while Muslims in the rest of the country
enjoy greater religious freedom. 20 Article 36 of the People’s
Republic of China’s constitution guarantees citizens “freedom of
religious belief” and the protection of “normal religious
activities.” 21 Article 36 prohibits “making use of religion to engage
in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens,
or interfere with the educational system of the State,” and provides
that “[r]eligious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any
foreign domination.” 22 Despite the freedoms Article 36 provides,
the undefined terminology makes it ambiguous whether “China’s
constitution protects the same range of belief that is recognized
under international law.” 23
The religious control and treatment of Uighurs began to
worsen in 1955 when Xinjiang was designated as an autonomous
region instead of a province. 24 Due in part to the rich natural
resources and economic potential in the region, an increased

Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in
Xinjiang, 10-13 (Vol. 17, Apr. 2005).
20
Eleanor Albert, Religion in China, Council on Foreign Relations (Mar. 15,
2018).
21
China: Religion and Chinese Law, The Law Library of Congress, Global
Legal Research Center (June 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1068681/download.
22
XIANFA art. 36 (1982, as amended in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004), the State
Council of the People’s Republic of China,
http://english.gov.cn/archive/laws_regulations/2014/08/23/content_281474982
987458.htm.
23
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, U.S. Government Publishing
Office (Oct. 5, 2017),
https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/2017%20Annual%
20Report%20_2.pdf.
24
Preeti Bhattacharji, Uighurs and China’s Xinjiang Region, Coun. For. Rel.
(May 29, 2012).
19
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number of Han Chinese moved to Xinjiang. 25 As of December
20th, 2020 the Han Chinese form two-fifths of Xinjiang’s total
population. 26 Human rights watchdog organizations have
documented that the economic benefits of resource extraction and
development disproportionately benefit Han Chinese citizens while
the Uighur people face increasing marginalization. 27
The economic and geopolitical value of Xinjiang has
contributed to tensions between ethnic groups in the region. 28
Xinjiang is China’s largest base for cotton, lavender, and hops as
well as a major area for sheep and cattle. 29 In 2012, Xinjiang’s
agriculture sector accounted for 17.6% of China’s gross domestic
product. 30 Xinjiang is also rich in mineral deposits, holding the
largest reserves of oil, natural gas, and coal in the country. 31 When
China colonized Xinjiang, leaders sought to control space,
resources, and people by occupying land as well as establishing
exclusionary property and coercive labor systems. 32 Due to this,
economic disparities between Han Chinese and Uighurs have
grown consistently since the 1980s. 33 Uighurs looking for jobs
often face discrimination from employers who favor Han
Chinese. 34 Additionally, Chinese economic policies encouraging

Hsieh & Falkenheim, Supra note 2.
Amy Liu & Kevin Peters, The Hanification of Xinjiang, China: The Economic
Effects of the Great Leap West, Stud. in Eth. and Nationalism, 267-270 (Vol. 17,
2017).
27
Anthony Howell & C. Cindy Fan, Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang:
A Survey of Han and Uyghur Migrants in Urumqi, 52:1 Eurasian Geo. & Econ.,
119 (2011).
28
Lui & Peters, Supra note 25 at 269-70
29
Hong Kong Trade Development Council 2017
30
Id.
31
Lui & Peters, Supra note 25
32
Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Settler Colonialism as Structure: A Framework for
Comparative Studies of U.S. Race and Gender Formation (American
Sociological Association, 2015).
33
Supra note 20.
34
Id.
25
26
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immigration into Xinjiang have created a limited job market and
prompted a population boom in the area. 35
In 1997, Uighurs peacefully protested their treatment,
demanding equality, religious freedom, and political autonomy. 36
In response, China initiated its “Strike Hard Campaign,” 37 sending
armed police to dismantle the protests. 38 What resulted became
known as the Ghulja Massacre. 39 Reports vary, but Chinese
officials claim nine people were killed and nearly 200 were injured
during the riots. 40 Uighur sources in Kazakhstan claim as many as
100 died. 41
The aftermath of the protests marked a shift in Chinese
policies towards Uighur separatists. 42 Chinese authorities executed
leaders and jailed an estimated twenty-seven people for their roles
in the unrest. 43 According to foreign nationals, by the end of the
year, the Chinese military had killed closer to 200 Uighur
nationalists and had arrested more than 2,000. 44 In retaliation to
China’s response, separatists planted bombs in Yining and Urumqi,

35

Id.
Dana Carver Boehm, China's Failed War on Terror: Fanning the Flames of
Uighur Separatist Violence, 2 Berkeley J. Middle E. & Islamic L. 61 (2009).
37
Human Rights Watch, Anti-Crime Campaigns and Religious Repression.
(2005) “Strike Hard” is a term used to refer to anti-crime campaigns that mass
arrest alleged criminals. These campaigns commonly result in the unlawful
arrest and sometimes the wrongful execution of large numbers of people.
According to Amnesty International, over 200 death sentences were recorded in
Xinjiang because of such campaigns between 1997 and 2003.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Why is there tension between China and the Uighurs?, BBC news (Sept. 24,
2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26414014.
41
Hyer, supra note 3.
42
Boehm, Supra note 34 at 64
43
Murray Scot Tanner & James Bellacqua, China’s Response to Terrorism,
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (June 2016).
44
Fergus Shiel & Sasha Chavkin, China Cables: Who Are the Uighurs and Why
Mass Detention?, Intern. Consortium of Inves. J. (Nov. 24, 2019). See also: Uni.
Of Central Arkansas, China/Uighurs (1949-present).
36
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killing several people. 45 China executed eight people for
involvement in the bombings. 46
Tensions came to a head during the Urumqi Protests in
47
2009. After peaceful protestors ignored orders to disperse,
Chinese police used force (fire hoses and batons) to break up the
crowd. 48 The protestors fought back, and over 150 people
(including both Han and Uighurs) were killed. 49 By July 8, 2009,
police and army forces poured into cities across the region to
enforce informal martial law. 50
Violence continued between Uighurs and the Chinese
government when, in 2012, six Uighurs reportedly tried to hijack a
plane from Hotan to Urumqi. 51 Twenty-seven people died after
police opened fire on (what state media described as) a mob armed
with knives attacking government buildings. 52 In 2014, an
estimated thirty-one people were killed with ninety more
sustaining injuries when terrorists detonated a series of explosives
at an Urumqi market. 53 The Urumqi attacks marked a shift in
governmental treatment of Uighurs, who were blamed for the
Patrick E. Tyler, In China's Far West, Tensions With Ethnic Muslims Boil
Over in Riots and Bombings, N.Y. Times (Feb. 28, 1997),
https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/28/world/in-china-s-far-west-tensions-withethnic-muslims-boil-over-in-riots-and-bombings.html.
46
Id.
47
Tania Branigan, Ethnic Violence in China leaves 140 dead, The Guadrian
(July 6, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/06/china-riotsuighur-xinjiang.
48
Edward Wong, Riots in Western China Amid Ethnic Tension, N.Y. Times,
(Jul. 5, 2009). https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/world/asia/06china.html
49
Stanley W. Toops, Understanding the Disturbances in Xinjiang, EInternational Relations (July 9, 2009), https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/1818.
50
Id. After the protests, police and army forces were mass sent to Urumqi to
control the region. Although martial law was never declared the crackdown
served to act as an equivalent state of security.
51
Why is there tension between China and the Uighurs?, BBC News (Sept. 26,
2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26414014.
52
Id.
53
Mary Tanner & James Bellacqua, China’s Response to Terrorism, U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission (June 2016).
45
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incident. 54 This lead to increased unrest in the region throughout
2014. 55 In response, China launched its "year-long campaign to
end terrorism.” 56 A strategy based on three pillars: (1) enhanced
regional economic growth, (2) stronger internal security
capabilities; and (3) deepened control over ethnic and religious
activities. 57 Ultimately, this campaign led to the current “reeducation” centers. 58
It is unclear how accurate the reporting on these violent
incidents has been. The Chinese state media is heavily regulated
and reports from people present at the incidents can differ from the
official accounts. 59 Although Uighur separatists were blamed for
the violence, independent sources have been unable to obtain
definitive evidence as to the identities of those responsible for the

54

Id.
Emily Rauhala, China Now Says Almost 100 Were Killed in Xinjiang
Violence, Time (Aug. 4, 2014).
56
Supra note 49
57
Supra note 51
58
Id (“[A]cts of violence that Chinese officials and state media have labeled as
terrorism do not meet the definitions of the term that are widely accepted outside
of China. Concurrently, other cases of violent crimes that observers would
describe as terrorism using these definitions are sometimes not described as
terrorism by Chinese authorities.”).
59
Beina Xu & Eleanor Albert, Council on Foreign Relations, Media Censorship
in China, (updated Fed. 17, 2017) (“China has one of the world’s most
restrictive media environments, relying on censorship to control information in
the news, online, and on social media. Censorship guidelines are circulated
weekly from the Communist Party’s propaganda department and the
government’s Bureau of Internet Affairs to prominent editors and media
providers. The government is particularly keen on blocking reports of issues that
could incite social unrest, like official corruption, the economy, health and
environmental scandals, certain religious groups, and ethnic strife.”).
55
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attacks. 60 The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (“ETIM”), a
militant group, have also been blamed for the violent incidents. 61
Despite the severity of the bombing incidents, the violence
Uighurs are known to have committed does not constitute a
western definition of terrorism. The United States defines acts of
terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents.” 62 Xinjiang has only sporadically erupted into
violence and the violence has historically been directed at Chinese
power structures and agents (e.g., police stations, government
buildings)—not civilians.63 Many of the incidents of violence
stemmed from peaceful public protests, only occasionally
organized by separatists, that turned violent following aggressive
Chinese law enforcement tactics. 64
DISCUSSION
a. Uighurs and China’s “Re-education Centers”
Since 2014, China has increasingly focused on security
measures in Xinjiang. In Uighur-dominated areas government
cameras, checkpoints, and police patrols were initiated. 65 Mass
arrests and sentencings were carried out for several "terror
groups.” 66 The Chinese state media published lists of people
convicted of alleged extremist activity and sentenced them to
60
Sui-Lee Wee, Chinese police blame separatist group for Urumqi bombing:
Xinhua, Reuters News (May 18, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/uschina-xinjiang/chinese-police-blame-separatist-group-for-urumqi-bombingxinhua-idUSBREA4H01O20140518
61
Beina Xu, Holly Fletcher & Jayshree Bajoria, The East Turkestan Islamic
Movement (ETIM), Council on Foreign Relations (last updated Sept. 4, 2014),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/east-turkestan-islamic-movement-etim.
62
22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (Jan. 3, 2007).
63
Boehm, supra note 34.
64
Id.
65
Philip Wen, Terror threats transform China's Uighur heartland into security
state, Reuters (Mar. 30, 2017).
66
Toops, supra note 47.
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death. 67 The first reports of the mass detainment of Uighurs in
"vocational schools" and "re-education" centers began in 2014. 68
The majority of Uighurs detained in the camps are held without
being formally charged or an explanation as to why they have been
detained. 69 It is common practice for the camps to hold prisoners
indefinitely. 70
In 2016, China began large-scale mosque destructions
under the “mosque rectification” program. 71 In 2017, China
revised its Regulations on Religious Affairs, stating, “the
management of religious affairs should adhere to the principles of
protecting legitimate religious activities, curbing and preventing
illegal and extreme practices, resisting infiltration, and fighting
crime.” 72 Another article prohibited individuals and organizations
from creating conflict between religious and non-religious citizens
and “from using religion to undermine ethnic unity, divide the
nation, or carry out terrorist activities.” 73 These regulations
substantially limit the freedom to practice religion within China
and prevents the education or practice of religion without special
permission. 74
According to a 2009 Congressional-Executive Commission
on China (“CECC”) report, Chinese officials often deny the
registration applications of religious groups that are not affiliated
with one of the officially recognized patriotic religious
Tyler, supra 24.
UHRP REPORT: The Mass Internment of Uyghurs: “We want to be respected
as humans. Is it too much to ask?”, Uyghur Human Rights Project(Aug. 23,
2018), https://uhrp.org/press-release/mass-internment-uyghurs-“we-want-berespected-humans-it-too-much-ask”.html.
69
Lindsay Maizland, China’s Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, Council on
Foreign Relations (June 30, 2020).
70
Id.
71
UHRP REPORT: Demolishing Faith: The destruction and Desecration of
Uyghur Mosques and Shrines, Uyghur Human Right Project (Oct. 28, 2019),
https://uhrp.org/press-release/demolishing-faith-destruction-and-desecrationuyghur-mosques-and-shrines.html.
72
Religious Affairs Regulations, 2 ¶1, (2017).
73
Id. at art. 4.
74
Id. at art. 9.
67
68
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associations. 75 For the religious minority of Uighurs, the
regulations strictly control their lives. 76 For example, in 2008 the
state prevented fasting during Ramadan. 77 Additionally,
individuals have been arrested for getting up before dawn to eat—
an imperative practice to ensuring Muslims stay nourished while
observing Ramadan—schools and institutions forced all students to
eat during fasting hours, and Muslim-owned restaurants were
required to remain open during Ramadan. 78 China also limits and
controls participation in Haj, the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca,
which is one of the five tenets of the Islamic faith, through
passport management. 79 Uighurs who do get passports have to
pledge they will not go on the Haj. 80 Furthermore, those who apply
for passports must provide fingerprints, voiceprints, and DNA
samples for analysis. 81
A CCP internal security report concluded that the Uighur
independence movement in Xinjiang is the main threat to China’s
stability. 82 An estimated one million troops are stationed in
Xinjiang; with no immediate external threat, troops are seemingly
positioned to control ethnic unrest and guard re-education
centers. 83
Toops, supra note 47.
The Uighurs: A History of Persecution, Hearing before the Subcommittee on
International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight, 111 Cong. 28 (2009).
77
China bans Muslims from fasting Ramadan in Xinjiang, Aljazeera (June 18,
2015), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/6/18/china-bans-muslims-fromfasting-ramadan-in-xinjiang.
78
Id.
79
Toops, supra note 47. See also: The Embassy of Kingd. Of Saudi Arabia, The
Five Pillars Of Islam (last visited Jan. 14, 2021),
https://www.saudiembassy.net/five-pillars-islam.
80
Toops, supra note 47.
81
Kate Fitz Gibbon, A Culture Destroyed: China Expunges Uyghur Identity,
Cultural Property News (Aug. 27, 2018), https://culturalpropertynews.org/aculture-destroyed-china-expunges-uyghur-identity/.
82
Tanner & Bellacqua, Supra note 41 at 12
83
Up to one million detained in China’s Mass “re-education” Drive, Amnesty
International, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/china-up-to-onemillion-detained/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2020).
75
76
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b. Escalating Human Rights Violations
Leaked government documents emphasize the breadth of
tactics employed to control and isolate the Uighurs. 84 During the
Urumqi protests, Chen Quanguo, the current Communist Party
Secretary of Xinjiang, told thousands of police to prepare for a
“smashing, obliterating offensive.” 85 He and his leadership team
planned to detain Uighurs in large numbers, issuing a sweeping
order to “round up everyone who should be rounded up.” 86 This
phrase appears repeatedly in internal documents. 87 Authorities
were told to look for specific behaviors like wearing long beards,
giving up smoking or drinking, studying Arabic, and praying at
mosques—behavior common among devout Uighur Muslims—as
indicators of a potential detainee. 88
The leaked documents further told authorities to refer to the
detention centers publicly as “job training facilities” and to portray
them as relatively mild methods to address the problem of Islamic
“extremism.”"89 Chinese officials referred to Uighurs as people
“infected” by the “virus” of Islamic radicalism that “must be
quarantined and cured.” 90 Further, the government referred to
the systematic detention of Uighurs as “ying shou jin shou,” a
phrase typically used to demand officials be vigilant and
comprehensive in collecting taxes; applied in this way, the phrase
is dehumanizing to Uighurs. 91 Notably, the directives made no
mention of judicial procedures for people being detained. 92
84
Austin Ramzy & Chris Buckley, The Xinjiang Papers: Absolutely No mercy’:
Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims, N.Y.
Times (Nov. 16, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiangdocuments.html.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
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Officials who failed to carry out the crackdown or did so
slowly were punished and jailed. 93 Uighur officials were accused
of protecting and shielding their fellow Uighurs. 94 Information on
surveillance in Xinjiang showed the system flagged over one
million people as potential threats simply for having a data sharing
app on their phones. 95 Authorities ordered the individual
investigation of 40,557 flagged people and stated that "if it is not
possible to eliminate suspicion" they should be sent for
"concentrated training." 96
China consistently denies the internment of any Uighurs,
instead claiming the facilities Uighurs are detained in are
“vocational training centers” that emphasize “rehabilitation and
redemption” and are part of efforts to combat terrorism and
religious extremism. 97 A forensic analysis of satellite images of 39
of these facilities shows they are rapidly expanding. 98 Between
April 2017 and August 2018, the facilities tripled in size, covering
an estimated one million square meters, roughly the size of 140
soccer fields. 99 The construction of new facilities and expansion of
existing facilities largely began around April 2017, one month
before Beijing enforced new anti-extremism regulations in
Xinjiang. 100 Before April, the site was a desert without a single
building. 101
93

Id.
Id.
95
Scilla Alecci, How China Targets Uighurs ‘One by One’ for Using a Mobile
App, International Consortium of Invest. Journ. (Nov. 24, 2019),
https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/how-china-targets-uighurs-oneby-one-for-using-a-mobile-app/.
96
Data leak reveals how China 'brainwashes' Uighurs in prison camps, BBC
News (Nov. 24, 2019) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50511063.
97
Philip Wen & Olzhas Auyezov, Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag, Reuters
Investigates (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/specialreport/muslims-camps-china/.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
94
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Notices posted to local government websites provide
insight into the features of eighty of these camps. Documents
include references to guardhouses, surveillance systems that leave
“no blind spots,” automatic weapons and their safe storage,
telecommunication “control systems” to monitor the content of
“trainee” telephone conversations, and the forcible interruption of
detainee phone calls. 102 Recently, the government has stopped
publishing the notices and began deleting the old ones from the
internet. 103
Chen also called for the installation of technologyenhanced surveillance across Xinjiang. 104 Tens of thousands of
security personnel were recruited to staff police stations and
checkpoints. 105 Scanners equipped with facial recognition cameras
have been installed in public places such as mosques, hotels, and
transportation hubs. 106
Within the detention centers, every aspect of a detainee’s
life is monitored. 107 According to leaked documents, detainees are
assigned a fixed bed position, fixed queue position, fixed
classroom seat, and fixed station during skills work. 108 The
documents also dictate how guards are to interact with detainees,
by “implement[ing] behavioral norms and discipline requirements
for getting up, roll call, washing, going to the toilet, organizing and
housekeeping, eating, studying, sleeping, closing the door and so
forth." 109 Most disturbingly, the memo orders guards to “never
allow escape, increase discipline and punishment of behavioral
violations, promote confession, and [ensure] full video surveillance
coverage of dormitories and classrooms free of blind spots.” 110
102

Id.
Id.
104
Ramzy & Buckel, supra note 89
105
Id. See also: Chris Buckley & Paul Mozur, How China Uses High-Tech
Surveillance to Subdue Minorities, N.Y. Times (May 22, 2019).
106
Wen & Auyezov, supra note 48.
107
Supra note 101
108
Supra note 56.
109
Supra note 45.
110
Id.
103
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The leaked documents also include explicit directives to
arrest Uighurs with foreign citizenship and to track Uighurs living
abroad. 111 The document suggests, although does not outright
state, that China's embassies and consulates are involved in the
global search for Uighurs. 112
Since Chen Quanguo’s orders in 2017, mass detainments of
Uighur Muslims have skyrocketed. 113 Between 800,000 to 2
million. Uighurs have been detained and sent to the “re-education”
camps. 114 Authorities often refuse to issue information to
relatives–especially to those living abroad–on the whereabouts of
family members. 115 Overall, information on what happens in the
camps is limited, but detainees who have fled China describe
oppressive conditions.
Previous detaineesFormer detainees recounting their
experiences have said they were subjected to political
indoctrination including being forced to: pledge loyalty to China,
renounce Islam, recite communist party policies, recite Chinese
laws, sing the Chinese national anthem, and learn Mandarin.
People who fail to correctly memorize dictums are denied food. 116
Further, detainees were forced to engage in self-criticism sessions
and report on fellow detainees, relatives, and neighbors. 117
Some detainees have reported prison-like conditions, with
cameras and microphones monitoring their every move and
remark. 118 Others recall instances of torture, including sleep

Supra note 57.
Id.
113
Chris Buckely, The Leaders Who Unleashed China’s Mass Detention of
Muslims, N.Y. Times (Oct. 13, 2018).
114
Lindsay Maizland, China’s Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, Council on
Foreign Relations (last updated June 30, 2020)
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uighurs-xinjiang.
115
World Uyghur Congress, https://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/current-issues/
(last visited Dec. 31, 2020).
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deprivation, interrogations, sexual abuse, forced abortions, and
forced contraception. 119
It is common knowledge that detention also disrupts and
displaces families. Children whose parents have been sent to the
camps are often forced to stay in state-run orphanages. 120 Uighur
parents living outside of China have to choose between returning
home to be with their children, thereby risking detention, or
staying abroad, separated from their children and unable to contact
them. 121 Foreign reporters who attempt to investigate the region
are closely followed by Chinese security forces. 122 Police have also
placed temporary roadblocks to block reporters from reaching the
camps. 123
c. International Response, Asylum, and Refugees
International response to Uighur detainments has been slow
and limited. Although China does not sign on nor participate in
many of the UN agreements, China still holds sway on the
international field with influence over much of the world's trade
and manufacturing. 124
Uighurs attempting to flee Xinjiang face foreign
immigration systems and difficulty obtaining visa documentation.
At the height of detainments, Executive Order 13780 (“the travel
ban”) was issued, severely impacting Muslim refugees and asylum
seekers. 125 Executive order 13780 cut the refugee program in half,
capping it at 50,000 people. 126 Now, new asylum policies have
fundamentally changed the definition of persecution under the law
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making the claim extremely difficult to meet. 127 Further, persistent
prejudices surrounding Muslims have greatly impacted refugee and
asylum claims worldwide (most notably in western countries). 128
Uighurs have also tried to seek asylum in over fifty different
countries including Turkey, Burma, and Laos. 129
Even after fleeing, Uighurs face the risk of deportation and
harassment at the hands of CCP officials. 130 Over four hundred
Uighurs have experienced intrusive surveillance, scare tactics like
death threats, intimidating phone calls and having their family
members in China targeted to suppress their activities abroad. 131
Often harassment and threats are targeted at Uighur activists or
former detainees who openly share their experiences. 132
The Chinese government relentlessly pursues Uighurs and
uses its influence to pressure host countries into returning Uighur
refugees and asylum seekers. 133 In 2015, Thailand detained around
fifty Uighurs and returned nearly one hundred to China. 134 In 2017,
Egyptian authorities rounded up hundreds of Uighurs, including
students, and deported them back to China. 135 Most are thought to
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have ended up in Xinjiang internment camps. 136 Once returned to
China, Uighurs often disappear or are subjected to arbitrary
detention, torture, and other serious human rights violations. 137
In the past 20 years, over 300 confirmed Uighurs have been
forcibly returned to China from 16 different countries. 138 These
numbers do not include the Uighurs who were secretly returned to
China by neighboring states. 139 These individuals are often
students, refugees, and asylum seekers. 140
Other foreign governments like Malaysia or Sweden have
resisted Chinese pressure and refused to deport or return Uighur
individuals to China.141 Instead, these countries consider Uighur
asylum claims or allow Uighurs to travel onwards to safe
destinations. 142 Sweden and Germany’s governments have enacted
policies to halt all deportations of Uighurs from their respective
countries until further notice. 143 Three resolutions from the
European Parliament called on EU member states to refrain from
returning Uighurs to China. 144
In 2019, most western countries signed a letter to the UN
human rights chief condemning China’s actions. 145 In response the
UN chief demanded access to the camps. 146 The European Union
has called on China to respect religious freedom and change its
policies in Xinjiang. 147 In 2019, Turkey became the only MuslimSupra note 64.
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majority country to voice concern when its foreign minister called
on China to ensure “the full protection of the cultural identities of
the Uighurs and other Muslims” during a UN Human Rights
Council session. 148
Many Muslim countries with close ties to China have
remained notably silent, seemingly prioritizing economic ties and
strategic relationships with China. 149 In July 2019, more than three
dozen states, including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, signed a
letter praising China’s “remarkable achievements” in human rights
and its “counterterrorism” efforts in Xinjiang. 150
International ability to intervene is limited. China is not a
party to UN International Criminal Law (“ICC”) which prosecutes
crimes against humanity and China resides on the UN Security
Council, meaning it holds veto power over referrals to the ICC. 151
In October of 2019, the United States imposed visa
restrictions on Chinese officials who were believed to be
responsible or complicit in the detention of Uighurs in Xinjiang. 152
The U.S. also blacklisted two dozen Chinese companies and
agencies linked to abuses in the region blocking them from buying
U.S. products. 153 In 2020, President Donald Trump signed a policy
sanctioning individuals, including Chen Quanguo, for human rights
abuses against Uighurs. 154 The law requires U.S. businesses and
individuals selling products to or operating in Xinjiang to ensure
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their activities do not contribute to human rights violations,
including the use of forced labor. 155
U.S. policies preventing use of forced labor are also being
expanded in the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which
passed in the U.S. House of Representatives on September 22,
2020. 156 If the bill becomes law, U.S. authorities would have more
power to enforce the law. 157 For example, public companies would
be required to certify to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) that their products are not made using forced labor from
Xinjiang. 158 If companies are found to have used forced labor from
the region, they could be prosecuted for security violations. 159 It is
estimated that more than 80,000 Uighurs have been transferred out
of Xinjiang to work in factories across China between 2017 and
2019, and some of them were sent directly from detention
camps. 160 Uighurs are thought to be working in factories that are in
the supply chains of at least 82 well-known global brands in
technology, clothing and automotive sectors including: Amazon,
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L.L. Bean, Nintendo and BMW. 161 Already, lobbyists for
corporations like Nike and Apple are trying to weaken the law. 162
The location of Xinjiang is a critical link in China’s supply
chain. Particularly for a new Chinese trade plan the Belt and Road
Initiative. Launched in 2013 by President Xi Jinping, the initiative
plans to construct a new overland route through Xinjiang as well as
a maritime route through the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. 163
The Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”) is a collection of
development and investment projects stretching through Asia and
Europe. 164 If successful, the Plan would significantly expand
China’s economic and political influence. 165 It is estimated that
China has already spent 60 billion dollars on the BRI and plans to
build physical infrastructure and around fifty special economic
zones. 166 Some political science experts suggest the BRI is a large
factor in the displacement and detainment of Uighurs. 167
Therefore, Sanctions would be more effective if other
governments imposed similar restrictions on the CCP as well as
companies utilizing forced Uighur labor. 168 If the international
community came together and universally imposed sanctions on
China’s trade and trade initiatives, an industry China currently
dominates and receives immense funding from, it would put
pressure on China to stop the interment and human rights violation
of Uighurs. While criticisms and indictments from global leaders
161
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are a start, currently, no country is willing to stand against China
and go further in their protection of Uighurs. 169 At minimum,
collectively imposing sanctions on companies, agencies, and
individuals involved in the human rights abuse of Uighurs would
send a powerful message.
d. Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide
Under international law and the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”), China—at minimum—is
committing crimes against humanity . 170 Crimes against humanity
are any of the following acts when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population:
(1) Murder; (2) Enslavement; (3) Deportation or forcible
transfer of population; (4) Imprisonment or deprivation of
physical liberty; (5) Torture; (6) Rape, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence;
(7) Persecution against any identifiable group or
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural,
religious, gender, (8) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(9) Other inhumane acts causing great suffering, or serious
injury to body or mental or physical health. 171
Crimes against humanity can occur during peacetime. 172
Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute determines that crimes against
humanity must be committed in furtherance of a State or
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organizational policy to commit an attack. 173 In contrast with
genocide, crimes against humanity do not need to target a specific
group. 174 Instead, the victim of the attack can be any civilian
population, regardless of its affiliation or identity. 175
Out of the ten possible crimes against humanity under the
ICC, China is known to be perpetuating: imprisonment, forcible
transfer of a population, persecution against a religious group, and
enforced disappearances. 176 Additionally, China has been accused
of committing torture, sexual violence, forced labor (enslavement),
and murder. 177 Therefore, the systematic persecution of Uighurs
through large-scale detention programs, the abuse of detainees,
enforced sterilization, and denial of information regarding the fate
of persons in state custody all constitute crimes against humanity.
Critically, as of writing this article, China’s governmental
actions have progressed past crimes against humanity into
genocide. Article II of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide narrowly
defines genocide to mean acts committed with the intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial,
or religious group, including: (1) killing members of the
group, (2) causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group, (3) deliberately inflicting
conditions on the group calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part, (4) measures
intended to prevent births within the group, and (5)
forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group. 178
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Under Article I, genocide can take place whether in armed
conflict, internationally, or in peaceful situations. Additionally,
Article I dictate that the contracting parties to the convention have
an obligation to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. 179
The mens rea to commit genocide is proved on a case-bycase basis through evidence demonstrating a consistent pattern of
behavior established before the genocidal acts. 180 These actions
include political doctrine that gives rise to the acts, repetition of
destructive and discriminator acts, and “deliberately and
systematically targeting victims on account of their membership of
a particular group while excluding the members of other
groups.” 181
When the Uighur detainments are viewed within the
historical context of China’s treatment of Muslim minorities, a
consistent pattern of governmental behavior against Uighurs forms
and intent to destroy or remove Uighurs may be inferred. 182
China’s political doctrines have directly given rise to the present
treatment of Uighurs. 183 China has effective state control of
religious institutions with its national constitution giving citizens
the freedom of “normal” religious practice, without defining what
“normal” means. 184 Leaving “normal” undefined allows China to
stipulate common Muslim practices as illegal. 185 These laws are
specifically applied to the Xinjiang region and authorities have
defined 26 religious activities as illegal, including wearing veils,
homeschooling children, long beards, and praying in public. 186
Additionally, the “counter-terrorism” and “strike hard” campaigns
have directly led to the genocidal acts of Chinese authorities. 187
179
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Intent is further illustrated by the destruction of mosques, forced
labor of Uighurs, surveillance, and restriction on Uighur rights as
well as the phrasing utilized to dehumanize Uighur people in
official Chinese directives. 188 Therefore, China has “the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious
group.” 189
The internment of Uighurs and their treatment by CCP
fulfill the elements for acts of genocide under the UN
Convention. 190 Elements of genocide two through five largely
occur within the “re-education” centers. 191 Sexual violence, threats
during interrogation, inhumane treatment, and torture all constitute
serious bodily or mental harm. 192 Uighurs who have experienced
detainment described prison-like experiences, including being
shackled to chairs for days, interrogations, sleep deprivation, and
sexual abuse, like being forced to smear ground chile pepper
mixture on their genitals. 193 Additionally, mental harm has led to
suicide and suicidal ideation. 194
Methods of group destruction do not need to immediately
kill those persecuted. Instead, the perpetrator can seek their
physical destruction by forced subsistence diet, systematic
expulsion from homes, or the reduction of essential medical
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services below the minimum requirement. 195 It is likely the “reeducation” centers themselves are meant to inflict on Uighurs
conditions of life calculated to bring about their destruction.
Uighurs have reported being denied food or have been forced to
eat pork and dog meat against their religion, sleep deprivation, and
torture. 196 Hygienic conditions have been described by escaped
detainees as unsanitary. 197 Cells are described as being 430 square
feet and holding around 60 people. 198 Each cell contains a single
uncovered, unwalled, hole in the corner as a toilet for all detainees
to use. 199
Element four of genocide, imposing measures intended to
prevent births within a group, include: the practice of sterilization,
forced birth control, separation of the sexes, and prohibition of
marriages. 200 Recently, an Associated Press investigation found
that China is subjecting thousands of Uighur women to pregnancy
checks, forced intrauterine devices, sterilization, and abortions as
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population control measures. 201 Notably, the use of IUDs and
sterilization has fallen nationwide but is rising sharply in
Xinjiang. 202
Families with parents moved to “re-education centers” have
their children forcibly removed and given to another ethno-religion
group. 203 More than 400 children have lost not just one but both
parents to some form of internment, either in the camps or in
prison. 204 Over 100 children have disappeared, assumably into
orphanages, while their parents were detained abroad or within
Xinjiang. Parents have not been given information about their
child’s location. 205 Children who end up in foster care and
orphanages are given a new Chinese name and placed with Han
Chinese families. 206 Other children are sent to boarding schools. 207
According to CCP planning documents the schools are designed to
assimilate and indoctrinate children at an early age, away from the
influence of their families. 208 The schools are off limits to
outsiders and heavily guarded. 209 Chinese ambassador Liu
Xiaoming has claimed that no separation of children is taking
place: parents simply need to give the names of their children and

China cuts Uighur births with IUDs, abortion, sterilization, The Associated
Press (June 29, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c.
202
Id.
203
John Sudworth, China Muslims: Xinjiang schools used to separate children
from families, BBC News (July 4, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-china-48825090.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Yanan Wang & Dake Kang, China Treats Uighur Kids as ‘orphans’ after
parents seized, Associated Press (Sept. 21, 2018). See also: Gibbon, supra note
79
207
Amy Qin, In China’s Crackdown on Muslims, Children Have Not Been
Spared, N.Y. Times (Dec. 28, 2019, updated: Oct. 15, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/world/asia/china-xinjiang-childrenboarding-schools.html
208
Id.
209
Id.
201

27

the government will locate them. 210 However, the threat of being
detained and the change in their children’s name makes this
virtually impossible as the government tightly controls
information. 211
Finally, element one—killing members of the group—is the
most controversial as admitting to evidence of systematic killing
would pressure the international community to act despite China’s
economic power. 212 Additionally, reports of deaths are tightly
controlled by state media and the true number of Uighurs who
have died in detainment is unknown. 213 However, a prosecutor
need only prove that “the perpetrator intentionally killed one or
more members of the group, without the necessity of
premeditation.” 214 Although it is difficult to obtain accurate
information about the deaths of Uighurs within the state's control,
since 2014, over ten Uighurs have mysteriously “died in
custody.” 215 A former detainee described how the conditions
within the “re-education” centers killed nine people within their
cell. 216 Additionally, the President of the Uyghur Projects
Foundation and senior advisor to the World Uyghur Congress
claims that the total number of Uighur detainees in China and
those presumed dead now exceeds the total number of Jews
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detained and killed during the Holocaust. 217 A government official
in Xinjiang has reported that where there was once a population of
92,000 Uighur people in 2016, there remain only 20,000 people
today. 218 More than 80% of the Uighur population has disappeared
in four years. 219 Furthermore, China is enabling the potential mass
death of Uighur people through detainment during a global
pandemic. 220 Imprisoned Uighurs have limited access to hospitals,
nutrition, and quarantine areas. 221 It is reasonably foreseeable that
COVID-19 will spread rapidly and infect hundreds of vulnerable
people. 222 More than a dozen coronavirus cases have already been
reported in Xinjiang, but it is unknown if anyone in detainment is
infected. 223
Disturbingly, there is growing concern that detained
Uighurs are being used as “kill-on-demand” emergency donors for
Chinese Coronavirus patients. 224 According to the Journal of
Biomedical Research, China has one of the lowest organ donor
rates in the world, with a voluntary donor rate of only one for
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every two million citizens. 225 Of the 1.5 million Chinese citizens
who need an organ transplant donor each year, fewer than 10,000
receive a successful match and organ, representing a supply-todemand ratio of 1 for every 150. 226 Therefore, waiting times for a
suitable donor take years however, recently COVID-19 patients
have been supplied an organ in mere days. 227 The China Tribunal
concluded that because there was no evidence that the
infrastructure associated with China’s transplantation industry had
been dismantled, and without a reasonable explanation as to the
source of readily available organs, forced organ harvesting had
taken place. 228 Detainee reports include organ extractions on live
victims, who are consequently killed by the procedures. 229
Further, China’s treatment of Uighurs should be considered
cultural genocide. Although not formally recognized within
international law, cultural genocide describes the systematic
elimination of a group’s identity through measures such as:
forcibly transferring children away from their families, restricting
the use of a national language, banning cultural activities,
destroying schools, religious institutions, or culturally important
sites. 230 Cultural genocide has long been discussed within the
International Criminal Tribunal as well as during the drafting of
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the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 231
Typically, cultural genocide occurs simultaneously, or as a
precursor to, mass violence, but does not necessitate it.
In China and abroad, Uighurs are immersed in cultural
genocide. 232 Early on, Chinese officials targeted academics,
activists, and scholars as well as cultural figures. 233 Among those
who have disappeared into the camps are “Xinjiang University
officials including its President, Professors, and former Vice
Provost of Xinjiang Medical Institute, Uighur economist and writer
Gilham Tohti, pop star Ablajan Ayup (who is thought to have been
detained for singing about Uighur language education), football
player Erfan Hezim, a pro-footballer detained for “visiting foreign
countries,” and a religious scholar, Muhammad Salih Hajim, who
“died in custody.” 234
Chinese officials often accuse Uighur academics of being
“two-faced” and insufficiently loyal to the state, or of having
“nationalist tendencies.” 235 Uighurs have practically every aspect
of their lives restricted and monitored. 236 There are bans on
activities that had been ordinary parts of daily Uighur life –
prayers, giving traditional greetings, and fasting. 237 Uighurs can be
jailed for refusing to drink alcohol or eat pork. 238 Talking or
gathering in groups is forbidden. 239 Children in school are
encouraged to report on any ‘disloyal’ talk by their parents or
elders. 240 Dozens of graveyards and religious sites have been
destroyed and the Uighur language has been banned in Xinjiang
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schools in favor of Mandarin Chinese. 241 The use of Uighur
writing, signs, and pictures is prohibited. Inter-ethnic marriages are
actively promoted to slowly breed out “Uighurness”.
Advertisements offer cash and other material inducements to Han
men who take a Uighur bride. 242
As emphasized previously, within the detention centers
Uighurs are subjected to political indoctrination, and torture when
they fail to repeat laws and communist party dictum. Children have
been forcibly removed from their parents stopping the passing of
tradition and cultural identity. 243 Through such actions China is
systematically destroying the traditions, values, and language of
the Uighurs. Therefore, the UN should formally recognize the
treatment of Uighurs as cultural genocide and create a new tribunal
to hold perpetuates of cultural genocide criminally responsible.
Conclusion
Ultimately, if true, the above alleged facts indicate that the
CCP may have perpetrated all five acts prohibited under Article II
of the UN Genocide Convention. The Chinese government should
immediately grant the UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights access to “re-education centers”, internal records,
and detainees.
Further the CCP must halt widespread violations and
abuses of human rights, repeal the “Regulation on Deextremification” policies, release all Muslims being arbitrarily
detained in “re-education camps” and related facilities, end the
enforced separation of Uighur children from their families, stop the
practice of forcibly preventing births, and cease the deliberate
destruction of the unique cultural heritage of the Uighur
population.
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Moreover, CCP authorities should stop pressuring the
deportation of Uighur refugees, the surveillance and harassment of
Uighurs abroad, and end financial benefits for companies using
Uighur forced labor. If legal authorities choose not to deem
China’s internment and treatment of Uighurs as a genocide, the
international community should still find that China is committing
crimes against humanity upon the Uighurs and use this opportunity
to recognize and charge China with cultural genocide. At
minimum, the international community should place collective
sanctions against CCP authorities and trade with China while
human rights abuses remain.
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